



THE OPTIMUM USE OF ANTIBALLISTIC


















Tku document ha& been appJWvtd £oi public *&.-
Izjue, and 6ale; it& dUtAlbwUjon li unlimited.










Lieutenant Commander, United States Coast Guard
B.S., United States Coast Guard Academy, 1960
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of





This thesis is concerned with developing an optimal launching
schedule for ABM's deployed for defense of a number of point targets,
i.e. an ICBM complex. Let the attack occur in N stages with an
offensive strategy of saturation. A dynamic programming model is
developed for formulating the problem and a linear programming model
is used in its solution. Equations are developed for determining the
optimal number of ABM's to launch on each stage of the attack so as to
maximize the expected number of silos surviving. Multivalued point
target defense is discussed and formulated but no specific solutions
are offered. The ABM system (including radars, computers, etc.) is
not considered subject to attack. Some discussion of this aspect of
the problem is offered. Single ABM launchings per re-entry vehicle
are assumed, A test is developed to determine for what parameters
single launchings are preferred over multiple launchings, under the
assumptions of the attack.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis addresses the problem of efficient allocation of anti-
ballistic missiles (ABM's) during an enemy attack on United States'
land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's). The targets
(ICBM silos) are treated as "point targets", i.e., the area of the
target is small compared to the destructive capability of the attacking
missiles. This paper is concerned with optimizing defensive strategy
only, and reasonable assumptions are made concerning the strategy of
the offense.
For a discussion of offensive and defensive strategy optimization*'
during a single bat-tie, the reader is referred to Perkins, F. M.
,
Optimum Weapon Deployment for Nuclear Attack [Ref 1] and McEwen, W. R.
,
The Attack and Defense of Targets by M-issiles [Ref 2].* Perkins assumes
total knowledge both by offensive and defensive forces, and a complex
of point targets as the object of the battle, whereas McEwen discusses
the problem of a single point target using both probabilistic and game
theory models to obtain a solution. For a discussion of offensive
strategy optimization only
,
refer to Piccariello, H. J., Missile
Allocation [Ref 3] and McLaren, M. D., Walkup, P. W. , A Missile
Targeting Problem [ Re f 4 ] , and A Multiple Assignment Problem [ Re f 5 ]
.
Piccariello takes into account the vulnerability of control centers
as well as the silos. He develops solutions for the continuous and
discrete cases. Both papers coauthored by McLaren and Walkup are
closely related and should be read together. The first uses Monte
Carlo techniques for estimating expected damage and minimum damage
level for a given strategy. The second paper is concerned with optimal
programming and targeting of missiles prior to an attack.
This paper considers the attack to occur in stages, the number of
stages being dependent upon the size of the missile inventory of the
offense. The question for the defense is, "What quantity of defensive
forces (ABM's) should be expended at each stage of the attack in order
to maximize the number (or value) of undestroyed silos after the attack?"
Two general scenarios are considered. First, all silos (point targets)
are considered to be equivalent in target value and second, all silos
are not equivalent but rather belong to ordered classes. Both dynamic
and linear programming methods were applied in an attempt to formulate
and solve this problem. Although both of these methods were satisfactory
in the formulati-on phase, they proved less efficient than a direct ana-
lytical approach in obtaining a closed form solution.
From a practical viewpoint, the solution should necessarily be
restricted to being inter-valued, since it would be meaningless to
require the firing of 1/2, 1/3, or any other fraction of an ABM at an
attacking missile. This aspect of the problem is ignored but unlike
Pennington's [Ref 6] solution to a similar problem, the integar con-
dition is not thought to be critical in this analysis because of
assumptions made concerning the geometry of the targets and the capa-
bilities of the defense. Equations are developed, in terms of initial
parameters, for the optimal allocation of the ABM's.
Interest was developed for this thesis by Pennington's paper [Ref 6]
concerning the defense of a single point target against successive
missile attacks. Unless a large number of ABM's were available for
each point target, his solution often resulted in the firing of
fractional ABM's. Although such a result is mathematically correct, it
is not very useful. For example, firing 1/3 of an ABM at each of three
attacking re-entry vehicles (RV's) results in a higher target surviva-
bility than firing one ABM at only one of those three attacking RV's
(see Appendix A for a proof of this statement).
This analysis is restricted to single ABM launchings against any
particular RV. If a sufficient number of ABM's is available to allow
multiple launchings at a single RV, and to defend every undestroyed
silo on every attack, then the equations developed herein are inapplic-
able. An exact relationship defining the region of applicability for
this solution is developed in section (III.B.8). The general method
of this paper could be extended to a situation involving large numbers
of ABM's if a solution to that problem were desired. However, the
practicality demanded by scarce resources indicates that this would
probably not be the case. It seems unlikely that an attack would occur
at all if the defense were so well endowed with antiballistic missiles.
This implies a rational behavior on the part of the offense, which
might or might not be justifiable in a real situation.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
A. ASSUMPTIONS
If and when an attack should ever occur against the United States 1
intercontinental ballistic missiles
s
and should an antiba llistic
missile system be installed to defend those ICBM's, there arises the
obvious question, "How does the defense allocate ABM's so as to pro-
tect as many silos as possible from destruction?" In order to answer
such a question it is necessary to make some assumptions about the
nature of the attack, the reliability of the equipment, and the
geometry of the situation.
A "farm" will be defined to be an area of land throughout which
are scattered a number of silos containing ICBM's. The separation
of the silos is sufficient to disallow multiple destruction by a
single re-entry vehicle. If the re-entry vehicle is sufficiently
close to one silo to destroy it, then it is too far from any other
silo to cause its destruction. A re-entry vehicle is a single bomb
and the fact that it might have previously been released from a
warhead containing many bombs is not significant. Technology
available to distinguish decoys and similar systems from actual
re-entry vehicles, as well as the space and weight demanded by such
systems preclude their consideration. Every radar target approaching
the farm on a proper trajectory shall be treated as a re-entry vehicle,
The attack is to occur in stages
s
with the offense attacking every
silo in the farm on every stage. The offense will not be allowed a
"shoot-look-shoot" capability, i.e.-, the ability to ascertain battle
damage between stages and adjust his strategy accordingly. Since each
silo has the same probability of being undestroyed after the first
stage, the offense is necessarily required to attack all the silos
again on the second stage, or none. Unless the silos are of different
strategic value (to be discussed in chapter IV) they are equivalent
in the attacker's eyes on each stage of the attack. One further
assumption justifies this reasoning more completely. Each ABM in
the defensive system has the capability of defending any silo within
the farm. Thus it is not possible for the offense to concentrate
their attack so as to exhaust defenses in a portion of the farm. If
there is any ABM left for defense, it can be launched to intercept an
RV aimed at any silo within the farm. Thus the offense, if it attacks
the farm at all, is assumed to attack each silo at each stage until its
inventory is exhausted.
The silos, and the ICBM's they house, are the only targets attacked
by the offense. All ICBM control centers, the ABM complex itself, and
all associated radars are eliminated from consideration as targets.
Chapter IV, part B, discusses this subject more completely.
It is assumed that the defense can ascertain battle damage between
stages and thus defend only those silos which remain undestroyed. Once
a silo is destroyed, it is left undefended on future stages of the
attack, thus all RV's aimed at destroyed silos go unchallenged by the
defense. If a RV successfully penetrates the defense but misses its
preassigned target, it misses all targets. No lucky hits are allowed.
In a similar fashion, it is assumed that one ABM can destroy only one
RV. The spacing between offensive stages and between RV's within a
stage is sufficient to disallow multiple successes by any ABM. The
spacing between stages is not sufficient, however, to allow launchings
of ICBM's during" the attack. Only those ICBM's which survive the
entire attack can be used by the defense in a retaliatory attack.
B. DEFINITIONS
Some terms as they are used in this paper have been defined in
part A of this chapter. However, for ease of reference and complete-
ness, all terms used which require an exact definition are listed
below.
Point target: a target which has an overall surface area which
is small when compared to the destructive capa-
bility of a single re-entry vehicle.
ABM: antiballistic missile.
ICBM: intercontinental ballistic missile.
RV: re-entry vehicle, a single fission or fusion bomb.
Stage: a single wave of RV's which all arrive at their
targets at approximately the same time. There is
one RV per target per wave.
100% defense: that defensive strategy such that all undestroyed
silos are defended on a given stage.
Attack: a sequence of N independent stages, with stage N
occurring first in time and stage one occurring
at the end of the battle.
T .: the expected number of undestroyed silos immediately




the number of ABM's remaining in inventory immedi-
ately prior to stage (N-i) of the attack.
p„ . the probability that an ABM launched on stage (N-i)
successfully intercepts and destroys an RV.
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q: the probability that an undestroyed or unchallenged
RV destroys its assigned target.
The fact that stage N of the attack is defined to occur first in
time and stage one to occur at the end of the attack might seem strange
at this point. The reason for this backward numbering comes from the
dynamic programming formulation of the problem, and rather than use a
different notation in other sections, it is used consistently for all
formulations, and for the solution.
C. A DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING FORMULATION
1. Notation
At every stage of the attack, there is an expected number of
silos destroyed. This destruction can occur for a number of reasons,
First, every RV may not be challenged due to a scarcity of ABM's.
Second, except as a limiting case, ABM reliability for successful
interception is less than one. Of the RV's that go unchallenged and
those that successfully penetrate the defenses, some will be success-
ful in destroying their targets. Let Y
.
(stage return) be defined
as the expected number of silos destroyed on stage (N-i). A diagram





Each stage of the attack is identified by the index (N-i) , i = 0,
1, ..., N-l. At the beginning of each stage, there are a number of
ABM's still in inventory, X^ ., and an expected number of silos still
undestroyed, T. T „. For this stage, a quantity of ABM's, d„ ., isJ N-i J ' N-i
launched, leaving X. T >. A. ABM's for future defense. Y„ . silos are
'
fe N-(i+l) N-i
destroyed (expected number) leaving T ,.,-.>. as the expected number
of undestroyed silos for the beginning of the next stage. The d's
are the decision variables which are to be selected in an "optimal"
manner.
2 . The Mathematical Model
The problem, as stated in these terms, is then to select the
vector.^ = (d , d~
, ..., d ) such that the sum of the expected number






d, , d_ , . .
.
, d„ in an optimal way.12 N
a. The Stage Transformation Equations
Since d XT . ABM's are launched on stage (N-i), the numberN-i
remaining at stage (N-i)-l is
^-(i+l)
=
*N-i " dN-i (2 - 2)
and also since Y„ . silos are expected to be destroyed on stage
N-i r
(N-i), the expected number remaining is
T
N-(1+1) " TN-i " YN-i- '- <2 - 3)
However, Y„ . is a linear function of T„ . and d. T . as will be shownN-i N-i N-i
below.
(1) An Expression for Y>T , . Of the d >T . ABM's launchedv ' v N-i N-i
in defense of stage (N-i), p . are expected to be successful in
12
destroying their assigned RV's. But T RV's are approaching the farm,
of which T XT . are directed at undestroyed silos. Since the defendersN-i
are concerned only with defense of undestroyed silos, the ABM's
launched are directed at those T,,
.
RV's aimed at the undestroyed
N-i J




RV's that are challenged T„ . - p . d„ . are expected to penetrateN-i rN-i N-i r r
the defenses. Of these, the probability that each destroys its
assigned silo is q and thus, the expected number of ICBM's destroyed











N-(i+l) " Vi " q(TN-i " PN-1W
T
N-(i+1 ) =Vi (1 " '> + "H-i d»-i' < 2 - 5 >
3 . Ana lysis
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f (X T ) = min (Y + f (X T )) (2.8)JJJ j J J-L J-L J-'-
j
where X. , T. > d . > 0.
J J ~ J ~
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This expression (2.8), along with the stage transformation
equations j (2.2) and (2.5) is a dynamic programming formulation of
the problem. Unfortunately , the problem cannot be solved in closed
form as .presented here. To realize this, consider eq. (2.6)














Since the coefficient of d, is always non-positive, and negative for
all practical cases, the quantity in parenthesis can be minimized by
making d, as large as possible. However, d.. cannot be larger than
X.. since no more ABM's can be launched than there are in inventory,
and d, cannot be larger than T, since it is unnecessary to defend11 J
any silos which were previously destroyed. Now the matter becomes
a question of whether X.. > T 1 or T > X- .1 1 1—1
Consider X, > T-. . In this case there would be more ABM's
available for defense than were needed (recall only single ABM
launchings are allowed against any given RV) . This implies that
the excess ABM's should have been used at an earlier stage as
opposed to not using them at all. Any strategy, to be optimal,
will use all available ABM's for defense. Thus X.. must be equal
'1
to or less than T and
d* - X




1 1 11' 1













where X T > d > 0.





(1 - q) + qp2 d 2

















) = min (^q(2-q) T2 - (qp2 - q p2 )d 2 - qp^*).
d
2
Since 1 > q > 0, the coefficient of d„ is always non-positive, and d~
must assume its maximum value in order to minimize the expression in
parenthesis. This is where the problem arises if a closed form
solution is desired. It is not known whether X„ > T~ or T» > X„
and since the smaller of these two quantities is the upper bound
for d» , the maximum value of d„ cannot be determined immediately.
A tabular solution could be obtained once initial parameters were
specified but a more direct solution is sought.
The following chapter gives two linear programming models of
this problem. The second model is solved in closed form for all
decision variables.
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III. LINEAR PROGRAMMING FORMULATIONS
The problem addressed in this chapter is exactly the same as
introduced earlier. The same assumptions regarding the structure
of the attack and the defense will be used. All previously introduced




This model is presented for continuity and will not be solved in
closed form. Therefore only necessary equations are shown and the
details of their development are contained in Appendix B. However,
the reader should be cautioned that there are many aspects of model
I which are exactly the same as model II and an understanding of
model I is necessary before going on to model II.
Let z represent the expected total number of silos lost after all
N stages have occurred. Then
N
z = S Y. (see (2.1)). (3.1)
j-1 J
However, each Y. is a linear function of d. and T. as shown by eq
.
J J J
(2.4). It can further be shown (see Lemma 1) that each T. is a
linear function of d.'s, i - j+1, ... s N; thus, the expression for
z above can be written
z = D + D,d, + ... + D d (see Appendix B) . (3.2)oil N N r
Then the problem can be stated as follows





.\ dN-i " hi=0
(2) Vi^Vi i = 0, ... 5 N-l ., (3.4)
(3) dM . > i 0, . .., N-l.N-l —
The objective function, z, is linear. The coefficients of the
variables (derived in Appendix B) are as follows












1. Interpretation of Constraints
Constraint (1) requires the defense to launch all the ABM's
in inventory and available. Constraint (2) is discussed in detail
below and constraint (3) is a set of N non-negativity restrictions.
a. A Modification of Constraint (2)
Recall that the objective function is based upon the
assumption that only one ABM is launched at any given RV. Constraint
(2) assures that this assumption is not violated, but it must be
modified to be useful since each T . is a linear function of some of
J
the decision variables, namely d
. ,
-, , •.., d . Constraint (2) in the
form used above is understandable in relation to the physical
17
situations but the form given below would have to be used if model I




. JL p jy i -i> J
" (N " 1+1)
< v 1 -") 1 < 3 - 6 >j-N-i+l J
for i = 0, 1, . .., N-l.
This form of constraint (2) is stated as Lemma 2 in the next part of
this chapter and a proof is given.
If one wished to do so, this model could be solved by means of a,
simplex algorithm. Naturally, all parameters must be specified,
However, a general closed form solution for an equivalent model is
presented in part B which offers a faster, more efficient solution.
B„ MODEL II
1. Pre liminar ies
The two previous models used to formulate this allocation
problem both utilized the concept of minimizing the expected losses
or sum of expected losses for the N stages of the attack. Consider
now an equivalent model which is developed in order to maximize the
expected number of undestroyed silos at the end of the attack. Since
the. .defenses' ICBM's are designed for retaliatory, or second strike
capabilities, it is important to have as many as possible remaining
to carry out that mission.
Recall that T is equal to the expected number of undestroyed
o
silos after the farm has been subjected to an attack of . N stages.
The number of undestroyed silos prior to stage N is just T since
none have yet been lost. It has been assumed that the offense attacks
every silo on every stage, so the number of RV's aimed at undestroyed
silos on stage N (first in time) is also equal to T .
18
2 . Development of the Objective Function




N-1 f 1 "") + 1PN-1 Vl (3 ' 7)






-1) + <"»!! V (3 ' 8)







+ 1^ Vn + «N-lVr (3 - 9)
Comparing eq. (3.9) with eq. (3.8) leads to the general formula of
Lemma 1
.
Lemma 1 If there are T silos to be defended at the begin-
ning of an attack, then the expected number of silos remaining at
the beginning of stage (N-i), i=l, ..., N-l; is
T
N-i v 1-^ 1 + «. /. <i-'>j
" 0,'h1
Vj- (3 - io)j=N-x+l J
Proof Lemma 1 will be proved by induction. Note that eq
.
(3.8) is exactly the same as the equation produced by eq. (3.10) for
i=l. Therefore Lemma 1 is valid for i=l. Assume Lemma 1 is valid
for i=k. From chapter II, eq. (2.5) gives
T
N- (k+ i) W1"^ 1-""WW (3 - n)
Substituting eq. (3.10), using i=k, into eq. (3.11) for T yields




N-(k+l) ~ TN (1
"q) + q
.
= ( q) P
J J
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which is eq. (3„10) for i-k+l 3 and which completes the proof for Lemma
1.







(1-q) +qE (l-q) J ~ p.d.. (3.12)
3. Constraints
The constraints applicable here in model II are exactly the
same as those given in model I, and will be restated following Lemma
2. Constraint (2) must be modified however, as mentioned in part A
of this chapter.
Lemma 2 For each i; i=0, 1, . .„, N-l; the following inequality
is a restatement of constraint (2)
N i-fN-i+11 i
dN i - q S (l-q)
J { Vd < T (1-q) 1 . (3 ' 13)
~ 1 j-N-i+1 J J N
Proof Constraint (2) requires that, in general,
d
N=i < TN4 is0 > *>
"'-. N-l." (3.14)




s V 1"^ 1 + q s d-q) j " (N " i+1) p,d i-o, i, ..., n-l
- j-N-i+l J J
Substituting this expression into eq. (3.14) yields





- q E (l-q) j
- (N - 1+1)
p d < T^l-q) 1
j-N-i+1 J
which completes the proof of Lemma 2.
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4. The Complete Form for Model II
In summary, model II is
N
N




(1) \ Vi = XNi=0
N
(2) d - q S d-q) J
" (N ' i+1)




(3) dXT . > 1=0, ..., N-l.N-i — '
It is this model from which the closed form solution is obtained.
5. The Solution
a. A Physical Consideration of the Objective Function
The objective function can be written more concisely as
N
N
T = TM (l-q)
iN
+ S C.p.d. (3.17)
where C. = q(l-q) . Note that T (1-q) is a constant and has no
effect on the optimization process once T and q are specified.
Consider the case where
C lPl >C2 p 2 > ... >CN pN .
: (3.18)
This inequality will be valid whenever
(l-q)
j_1
p. > (l-q) j p for j=l, ..., N-l
is true, or Pj/Pj+1 > (1-q).
The quantity p./p. in is a fraction between zero and one since it has
J J+l
previously been assumed that ABM reliability decreases in time. Also,
21
practical values for q should be in the neighborhood of 0.6 to 1.0.
Thus, if p deteriorated by no more than 60$ per stage from its
previous value, eq. (3.18) is valid. It is hoped that ABM relia-
bility would not be reduced so drastically as to invalidate eq
.
(3.18).
b. A Characterization of the Optimal Solution
Theorem 1 If X^ ABM's are available for defense of an
N-stage attack, and if C.p. > C.p. for 1 < j < i; i=2 , ..., N; then





and d* = T. for i=k-l, .... 1 for some N < k < 111 — —
N




is the largest coefficient in the objective
function and T can be increased most by making d
1
as large as possible
since the coefficients of the decision variables in the first constraint
are all equal to one, Likewise, C„p„ is the next largest coefficient
and resources should be allocated to d„ whenever d.. is at a constrained
maximum. This reasoning can be continued up through C„p„ which com-
pletes the proof of Theorem 1.
In concept then, the solution is straightforward so long as the
coefficients are in descending order. However, obtaining equations
for the decision variables in order to allow direct computation is a
more involved process.
c. Additional Notation
Let W represent the expected number of ABM's required
n
to defend all undestroyed silos from stage n to stage one given there
22
are T undestroyed silos at the beginning of stage n. T can have
n n
any value from zero to T ,.J N
Let Q represent the expected number of ABM's required to defend
all undestroyed silos from stage n to stage one given jio ABM's were
launched prior to stage n.
d. Analysis






Suppose X^ = W
1
. Then the defense can achieve 100% defense on stage
one. Next, suppose X^ > W.. . In this case, those ABM's not required
on stage one are allocated to stage two. However, as ABM's are
allocated to stage two, the upper bound on d
1
increases (see con-




. represent the expected number of undestroyed silos
immediately prior to stage i given defense started on stage j,













(1_q) + q P2d2' (3 ' 21)





[l + (1-q)] + qp2d2 .
However, from the definition of W~ (100% defense), d„ in this instance





[1 + (1-q + qp2 )]. (3.22)





[1 + (1-q + qp3 ) + (1-q + qp3 ) (1-q + qp2 )]. (3.23)
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Lemma 3 For any stage j, N < j < 1,
W = T (l + \ n (1-q^p )). (3.24)
J J 1=1 k=l J





which is eq. (3.19). Thus Lemma 3 is valid for j=l.
It is assumed that Lemma 3 is valid for j=n. Consider stage
n+1:
w j-i = T j.1 + T mi + ••• + T i -d (3.25)n+1 n+1 n,n+l l,n+l
But T , n is a particular value for T . Therefore, from Lemma 3
n,n+l r n
the number of ABM's required to defend 100$ from stage n to stage
one is
n-1 i
W =T .-Cl+'E TT (i-q + qp , ,,)\
n n,n+l V .-,,-. rn-k+17i=l k=l
Also
T mi = T mi Q~& t qp .! d^.T (3 - 26 )n,n+l n+1 n+1 n+1
So











_£ TT (1-q + qPn .k+1 ))- (3-28)W = Tn n+1 w. ,. ^
-_i i _ii = l k=l
Returning to eq. (3.25)






n+ 1 C 1 + (l
- q + q>W <l +X „",^ + "'.W')l=1 k=l
V 1 = Vl C 1 + .==, " «-« + «n-k+2>> <3 - 29 >1=1 k=l
which is equivalent to eq. (3.24) with j = n+1. This completes the
proof of Lemma 3.
Using the definition of Q. and Lemma 3 produces
Q
i -(j ) V 1" (3 * 30)
j
N- i
since- T. = T (1-q) if no ABM's are launched on stages n+1, . .., N.
Using the first constraint and Lemma 3 with j=n-l yields
XM-.dN +Tn- 1 (1 + X A (l"' +qPn-k))-1=1 k=l
Let A be the coefficient of T , above. Then
n-1
X. . = d + T .A.
N n n-1
Also







since no defense occurred on stages n+1, ..., N. Thus
Solving for d* gives

















d5-j " dtj+l ""I + <»Vj+ l> J=2, ...-!. (3.35)
This form of the solution is most practical for actual computations
since the equations for each d* in terms of initial parameters
become very large and unwieldly.
e. Solution Algorithm
In summary, the solution algorithm is
(1) Compute Q , Q ,, . .., Q, in that order using eq. (3.30) until
that pair of Q's which bracket X is found. This yields the value
of n.




(4) Compute d* .; j=2, ..., n-1; using eq. (3.35).
In a practical sense, it is only necessary to compute n and then
d* and defend all undestroyed silos on each succeeding stage. Based
n
on expected values, this allocation will produce the maximum surviva-
bility of the silos.
f. The Optimal Value of the Objective Function
The objective function, eq . (3.12), was
N .




Because the optimal solution indicates that no ABM's are launched
prior to stage n, all decision variables with subscripts greater
than n are zero. Thus, the optimal value for the objective function





T* = T (1-q) + q £ (l-q) J p d*. (3.36)
j = l
J J
However, from eq. (3.33)
d
n-l TN








= (1-q +q pn .2 ) (1-q + qp^) (yi-q)^ 1 + qp^*)
Lemma 4 For every j; j=l, ..., n-1;






Proof Lemma 4 will be proved by induction. For j=l
s
eq. (3.38) reduces to
d*
1
= T(l-q) N ' n+1 + qp d*
n-1 N rn n
which is the same as eq. (3.37). Thus Lemma 4 is valid for j=l.













dS-(-H) = (1 " q + «»-> " a " q + ""n-h) (V 1-")"""" + ""n^
n=i
This can be written
d






which is the same form as Lemma 4 where j=m+l. This completes the
proof of Lemma 4.
Returning to eq. (3.36) and substituting eq. (3.38) for each d*;
j = l, . .
.
, n-1; yields
T* = T (l-q)N + q(l-q) n_1 p d* + BC (3.39)
o N - ' rn n
where B and C are defined as follows
n-1 . n-(j+l)
B = q S (l-q) J " p. ( TT (1-q + qpn .))
j = l J V=l n y
C = T.
T
(l-q)N-n+1 + qp d*.N n n










Equation (3.40) is the value of T* as expressed in terms of initial
parameters and n. This is a cumbersome form for calculations, but it
is developed here for use in a later section. See section 7 for a
more direct means of calculating T*.
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6 . Discussion
a. The Use of Expected Values
With the aid of computers, it would be possible and indeed
worthwhile, to recompute an entirely new solution following each stage.
This would result in a new d* after each stage, and avoid the inherent
n
discrepancies resulting from an analysis based on expected values.
It is unlikely that the actual number of undestroyed silos present
at any stage of a real attack would be the same as the expected number.
It must be remembered that the parameters q and N are estimates based
on the latest intelligence information available and are subject to
error. Even the p. values, for which some data can be gathered, are
subject to error. ABM's have never been launched or radars tested
under conditions of severe atmospheric disturbance as would be caused
by numerous nuclear blasts. Therefore, if an updated solution based
on actual values could be obtained between stages, better results
could be expected than by rigidly applying the complete initial
s olution.
Consider the situation in which an updated solution cannot be
obtained between stages. Based on the foregoing analysis, the
solution that should be used would be to defend on stage n with d*
n
ABM's. On each succeeding stage, defend all undestroyed silos,
whether or not the number was greater or less than expected for that
stage. If n were large, it is reasonable to assume that the number of
stages requiring more ABM's than expected would have a cancelling effect
on those stages requiring fewer ABM's than expected, and the shortage
or excess of ABM's at the end of the attack would likely be small com-
pared to X . However, if n were small the excess or shortage could be
a sizeable proportion of X^
.
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b, An Intuitively Appealing, but Erroneous Solution
When this problem was first considered, one apparent
solution was to select a subset of T and defend that subset completely
throughout the attack. Since it was assumed that a sufficient number of
ABM's would not normally be available to defend all the silos properly,
it was reasonable to assume that the number of ABM's available would be
sufficient to defend a smaller portion of T . In general, of course,
this is not true. However, if q equals one, this is precisely the
solution one does obtain from model II. So for this limiting value of
q, the intuitive solution is also correct. It would be foolish not to
defend on stage N since every silo undefended in this case is destroyed.
For q=l
Therefore
for all permissable values of X . Thus, defense starts on stage N in
all cases when q equals one.
c. The Estimate of N
The estimate of the parameter N is critical in this
solution. It is necessary for the defense to determine N, and for a
proper determination, the defense should be aware of the risks involved
in overestimating and underestimating the parameter. If the estimated
value for N turns out to be greater than the actual value, ABM's will
be left over, thus wasting resources and losing more silos than
necessary. On the other hand, if the estimated value for N is smaller
than the actual value, the offense can attack unchallenged resulting in
excessive losses of ICBM's.
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Consider the case where q equals one. Underestimating N would be
disasterous since one unchallenged stage results in complete loss of
all remaining silos. Overestimating, on the other hand, would result
in unused AMB ' s , but there would also be an expected number of undes-
troyed silos remaining. Conversely, for q close to zero, the opposite
is true, everything else remaining unchanged. Other parameters also
affect this balance. Without specific parameters to consider, it is
difficult to make any quantitative statements about the erroneous
estimation of N. Decision Theory and Game Theory both offer techniques
for optimizing the choice of N. A great deal of additional study could
be done on this facet of the problem.
7 . A Numerical Example
Consider a four stage attack and let the initial parameters












p 9 = 0.65
p, = 0.6.
a. Determining Q Values
From eq. (3.30)






Substituting for W, using eq. (3.24)
Q4 =T4 (lf 2 J(l-0.8 + 0.8p k )).1=1 k=l
Using given parameter values
Q4
= 150 (1 + 0.92 + 0.74 + 0.53)
or \- 477.9.
Then
V* 478 > 340
Similarly
Q3 - (W3/T3 ) T4 (l-q)
4 " 3
Q3 = 79.7.
So Q « 80 < 340.
b. Determining n and d*
n




340 - 150(0. 2)fl + S 7 (0.2 + 0.8p
4 _k )^)
1 + (0.8) (0.9) (l + T, TT (0.2 + 0.8p
4 _k K)i=l k=l
d* - 99.1 ^ 99.
n





d* = 101.3 w 101,
From eq. (3.35)
d* = d* (1 - 0.8 + 0.8p
3 )
d* = 101(0.2 + 0.6)
d* = 80.8 « 81.
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And also from eq. (3.35)
d* = 58.4 W 59.
4
Note that I d* = 340.
i=l
d. Expected Number of Silos Remaining
Using eq. (3.12), the objective function, and the results
above, the maximum expected value for T can be determined.r
o
max T = 150(0. 2)
4
+ 0.8 T. (0.2)J
_1
p.d*




In summary, the solution above instructs the defense to launch 99
ABM's on stage four, 101 on stage three, 81 on stage two, and 59 on the
final stage. This allocation will result in saving approximately 40
silos from destruction.
As a sidelight, notice that the expected number of silos saved
from destruction may be computed more directly without the use of the
original objective function. Because of the nature of the solution,
the following method is valid. Since d* = 59 ABM's, there are
expected to be 59 undestroyed silos at the beginning of the last stage.
Also, p 1 = 0.6, so 35.4 or approximately 36 RV's are destroyed on
stage one. Thus 23 RV's are expected to successfully pass through
the defense, but of these only 80$ are expected to be successful in
destroying their targets. Therefore 35.4 plus 4.6 silos or 40 silos,
are not destroyed on stage one. This is the same result one would
obtain if eq . (3.35) were extended to include i=n, with d* = T*. d*n / J
' o o o
33
has no physical meaning, but the pattern of the solution allows for
this simple extension. Thus
T* = d*(l - q + q Pl )
which algebraically carries out the same operations which were performed
verbally above
.
8. Maximum Number of ABM's Allowable
Recall that the models presented in this paper are all con-
cerned with single ABM launchings. Therefore, there exists an upper
bound on the number of ABM's which can be used in any anticipated
attack. Should the defense have a greater number of ABM's than this
upper bound, multiple launchings would very likely be preferred over
single launchings and the solution previously presented cannot be
rigidly applied. It remains to determine this upper bound.
a. Development
The maximum number of ABM's the defense can launch, using
single launchings only, is that number for which every stage is
defended completely, i.e. every RV aimed at an undestroyed silo is
challenged by one ABM on every stage of the attack. Thus
d* = T
N N
and (O = W._N max. N
since 100% defense occurs on each stage following stage N because of




Thus any number of ABM's equal to or less than (X^) is acceptable
If the ratio X/T satisfies the following inequality, the solution
given in this paper can be used.
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(X..) - T__ C 1 + (1-q + qpM , , , ) ).N max. N V . , . , KN-k+l
V
VTN * » + * " (l-« + «N-k+ l>1=1 k=l
For the example of section 7
Xjj/T = 340/150 = 2.3
and
3 i
1 + £ tt (0.2 + 0.8p ) = 1 + 0.92 + 0.74 + 0.53
i=l k=l 5
~k
it it it it _ o 2
Since 2.3 < 3.2, the solution presented in this paper is applicable.
9 . Single Launchings Versus Multiple Launchings
One of the assumptions made in this study was that only one
ABM would be launched in defense of an undestroyed silo on any parti-
cular stage, and that multiple launchings of ABM's would never be
preferred over single launchings. The term "multiple launchings"
used throughout this paper means the use of more than one ABM against
a single RV aimed at an undestroyed silo on a given stage. The
validity of this assumption is dependent upon the values of the para-
meters of the problem. The purpose of this section is to devise a
method for determining when the assumption is valid. Multiple
launchings of three or more ABM's per silo per stage will not be
considered, since this study is only concerned with those cases
where single launchings are optimal. It follows that if single
launchings are preferred over double launchings, then they are
preferred over any other type of multiple launch.
Consider eq. (3.40). An increase in X_ causes an increase in
T* given by
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qp (B + (l-q)
1"' 1
)




o 1 + Aqp N v '
A question one might ask is, given one additional ABM, should it be
used according to the solution algorithm presented in this paper or
should it be used to increase the defense of an undestroyed silo at
stage one? To answer this question it is necessary to compare the
marginal gain in T* resulting from both options.
If AX = 1, then AT* is equal to the coefficient of AX^ in eq
.
(3.41) where AT* is the increase in the obiective function if a new
o
optimal solution (for single launchings) is computed. In the case
where the additional ABM is used on stage one, the increase in T*
o
(call it D) is equal to the probability that a particular undestroyed
silo survives stage one given that two ABM's are launched in its
defense minus the probability that the same silo survives stage one
given only one ABM is launched in its defense. Thus
D =(l - q (I-P^ 2) - (l " q d-P^)
(3.42)
D = q Pl (l- Pl ).
Consider the case where n=l, that is, where defensive firing begins
on stage one. Using eq. (3.41)
2
qpi + qpi qpiU + q)
AT* = —i i = 1 #
o 1 + q p 1 + q P
Also D = q Pl (l - Pl ).
Note that AT* > D
o
—
since (1 + q)/(l + q Pl ) > 1 and (1 - Pl ) < 1, which is to say that for
Pl > 0, single launchings are always P referred over double launchings
on stage one given that defense begins on stage one.
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Next consider the case where n=2 . Then
2
q p 9 Pt + q(i-q)p 9 qp 9 (i - q + qpJ
at* =—— = — =-,
o 1 + qp2
1 + qp2
D does not change since the same change in X is being considered
throughout. Thus
D = q Pl (l- Pl ).
The assumption of single launchings is valid in this case so long as
p2
(l - q + q Pl )
—nr^ * p^i-pp-
Therefore, for any s Pecific set of parameters the following
general comparison may be made to determine if the set of parameter





for that value of n as determined by ste P one of the solution algorithm,
then the initial assumption denying multi P le launchings is valid on
probabilistic grounds. There may be Physical, engineering, or other
restrictions which prohibit multiple launchings.
Using the parameter values as given for the example of section 7,
where n=4
AT* = 0.104 and D = 0.192
o
which indicates that at least one of the ABM's designated for stage
four should be used on stage one if there is no valid reason to pro-
hibit multiple launchings. Thus, the example, although sufficient
for displaying the use of the solution algortihm, does not produce a
maximum survivability if multiple launchings are allowed. Therefore,
37
from a probabilistic point of view, there are cases where multiple
launchings are desirable even though some silos are undefended in
the early stages of the attack.
'
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IV. EXTENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM
A. MULTIVALUED TARGETS
Since this section involves equations which are analogous to model
II, and because a detailed analysis of this subject is not intended,
only those equations which characterize the problem and those comments
which could be useful for obtaining a solution are given. The next
section assumes silos ot three different values for discussion purposes
but any number of values (up to T ) is possible.
Consider each silo ot the farm to have associated with it a value,
v , v , or v where, without loss of generality, it can be assumed
that
v < V < V
I II III
Such values can be related to the retalitory capabilities of the ICBM's
located in the silos.
There are now three distinct classes of silos to be considered,
with T„, T„
,
and T. T numbers of silos in each class. The totalN N N
number of silos in the farm is just the sum of the numbers of silos







+ Trr + x£ .N N N N
All other assumptions of the basic problem are valid in this generalized
case. Let (TW)
.
be defined as the total worth of all undestroyed
N-i
silos immediately prior to stage (N-i). Then
(TW) = v T1 + v T11 + v Tk ; N IN II N III N
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1. The Objective Function
The purpose of the ABM system is to defend the farm so as to
maximize the capability for retaliation. Thus, in a development
analogous to the development of eq. (3.12), the generalized objective
function is
NIII





+ q 2 (l-q) J
- 1
p.d'"]
j = l J J
(4.1)
where d., d. , and d. are the decision variables representing the
numbers of ABM's to be launched in defense of each of the three classes
of silos on stage j. Such an objective function maximizes the total
capability for retaliation following an attack.
2. The Constraints
The generalized constraints can be written directly from eq.
(3.16) of model II. They are
III N-l
(1) \ * dN-l " hm=I 1=0
<2><C, -q I (l-q) J
- (N - 1+1)
Pjd™<^ (1-q) 1N-i j=N-i+l N






Note that, in eq. (4.1), the quantity





is fixed for a given set of parameters. Thus, optimization (maximization
of (TW) ) shall be concerned only with the remaining terms. Let qCm be




As in model II, an evaluation of the C. factors leads to the optimal
solution provided
p./p . > (1-q) (see section III.B.5).
One useful way to compare the C.'s is in the form of a matrix
where a. = C.. Each row of the matrix relates to a stage of thejm J
attack and each column is associated with a distinct class of silos.
Thus, the matrix for this section is N x 3 whereas the matrix for
model II is an N-dimensional vector.
Assume that each element of the matrix is different. Then there
exists an ordered sequence of matrix elements such that the first
member of the sequence is the largest element of the matrix, the
second member of the sequence is the second largest element of the
matrix, and so on. With the earlier assumption that v < v < vTTT ,
the first ABM's would be assigned to defend silos of class III on stage
one. The analysis could continue as in model II, but a separate
algorithm would be necessary for every feasible sequence of elements.
The number of feasible sequences increases rapidly as the number of
classes of silos increases and the method presented in this paper
becomes inefficient. A more general approach is necessary to obtain
an efficient solution to this generalized problem. ' Obtaining such a
solution is recommended as a topic for further study.
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B. OTHER TARGETS
It was assumed throughout this paper that the ABM's and associated
defensive equipment such as the radars and computers were immune to
attack by enemy RV's. Of course, in a real situation this probably
would not be true. The enemy might decide it would be to his advantage
to strike the defensive system first and then use fewer RV's on the
silos. In such a case a much larger problem exists than was presented
earlier. It would not be sufficient to merely assign radars, computers,
and ABM's values as targets since the values of radars, computers, and
ABM's are all interdependent. If no ABM's are available, radars and
computers are useless, and if the radars or computers are destroyed,
unlaunched ABM's are also of no value. Also, a simple, saturation,
offensive strategy could not be assumed for in this case there exists
a trade-off between attacking silos and attacking the ABM system in
terms of total silo destruction. It is only natural to assume that
the enemy would analyze this trade-off and attack in such a manner as
to maximize total silo destruction. Thus, for useful results, it
would be necessary to optimize offensive and defensive strategies,
s imultaneous ly
.
There are numerous other variations to the basic problem investi-
gated by this paper. There are also numerous other methodologies
available (game theory, decision theory, computer simulation) for
formulating, analyzing, and solving the problem variations. The ABM
question is a fertile field for analysis and is sure to receive a
great amount of attention in the future. This paper has been a modest
attempt at solving a simple form of a complex problem, and has tried to
present some insight into the nature of the greater problem.
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APPENDIX A
THE ANALYTICAL DIFFICULTY OF FRACTIONAL ABM'S
Let P represent the probability that a target survives three
consecutive, independent, attacking RV's given that a single ABM
is launched in defense. Then
P = (1-q) (1-q) [l - q (l-p)_
where q and p are defined as in part B, chapter II.
Let R represent the probability that a target survives three
consecutive, independent, attacking RV's given that 1/3 of an ABM
is launched at each RV. Then
R = 1 - q (l-p/3)
Now the problem remains to determine whether P > R or R > P. Assume
R > P. Then
[l - q (l-p/3)]3 > (1-q)
2 [l - q (l-p)_ .
Expanding both sides and collecting terms yields
LHS = 1 - 3q + 3q - q + pq + pq - 2pq + p q /3 - p q /3
3 3
+ pq/27.
RHS = 1 - 3q + 3q - q + pq + pq - 2pq .
















2 2.. 2 3,_
p q /3 > p q /3






Thus R = P only if p = and q = 1. Such values taken together are
totally outside the realm of interest. Thus it can be concluded,
for p > 0, and any < q < 1,
R > P.
So although it is mathematically convenient to do calculations




DETAILS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODEL I
A. REDEFINING THE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION
From eq. (3. 1)
N
z = S Y.
j-1 J
(B.l)
where Y. = qT . - qp d. (eq . (2.4)).
J J j J


















z = q S (T. - p d ). (B.3)






z = q S
j«l f




dJ " 1 ^Pj'j
N N N N
= qTN I d-q)




p, d - q Z p.d








p d - p d
k=j+l R ^ J J ~
(B.5)
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which is identical to the expression for D in eq. (3.5). It now
remains to separate the decision variables. Note that d, is in only
one term of the expansion, d„ is in two terms, d„ is in three terms,
and so on.
Expanding the bracketed part of eq. (B.5) yields, for
1 \T O
j = l: qp2
d
2
+ q(l-q) p^ + q(l-q) p^4 + ... + q(l-q) " p^ - p^
j=2:
j=3:
q(l-q) p3d 3 + q(l-q) p^4 + ... + q(l-q)





+ ... + q(l-q) N" p^ - p^
j=N-l
j=N:























The first term above is D-, as used in eq. (3.5). The general expression
for any of the terms above involving d„ , ..., d can be written
k-2
qpk [q g (1-qV - 1_
which is equivalent to the general term in eq. (3.5) when the sub-
stitutions t=j and k=N-i are used. The proof of eq. (B.6) will not
be given. It is analogous to the inductive proofs used for Lemmas 1
and 3.
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In conclusion, the objective function can be written
N
z = £ Y. or equivalent ly,
j = l
J
z = D + D.d. + D-d. + ... + D d
o 11 2 2 N N
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